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Abstract
The literature on optimal monetary policy typically makes three major as-
sumptions: 1) policymakers’ preferences are quadratic, 2) the economy is
linear, and 3) stochastic shocks and policymakers’ prior beliefs about un-
observed variables are normally distributed. This paper relaxes the third
assumption and explores its implications for optimal policy. The separa-
tion principle continues to hold in this framework, allowing for tractability
and application to forward-looking models, but policymakers’ beliefs are no
longer updated in a linear fashion, allowing for plausible nonlinearities in
optimal policy. We consider in particular a class of models in which pol-
icymakers’ priors about the natural rate of unemployment are diﬀuse in a
region around the mean. When this is the case, it is optimal for policy to
respond cautiously to small surprises in the observed unemployment rate,
but become increasingly aggressive at the margin. These features of optimal
policy match statements by Federal Reserve oﬃcials and the behavior of the
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1. Introduction
The literature on optimal monetary policy under uncertainty typically makes three major
assumptions: 1) policymakers’ preferences are well-approximated by a quadratic function,
2) the economy is well-approximated by a linear system of equations, and 3) stochas-
tic shocks and policymakers’ priors about unobserved variables are normally distributed.
While these assumptions contribute much in the way of tractability and simplicity to the
models and their solutions, it is important to understand the eﬀects of relaxing these con-
straints on the prescriptions for optimal policy. In particular, we demonstrate that relaxing
the assumption of normality in favor of a prior that is more diﬀuse in a region around the
mean provides a very plausible source of nonlinearity in optimal policy. Relaxing priors in
this way also seems to match statements by Federal Reserve oﬃcials and the Fed’s behav-
ior in the late 1990s, demonstrating that the optimal nonlinearities in this paper may be
important in practice as well as in principle.
It is well known that the Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian model deﬁned by assumptions
1–3 above yields an optimal policy response function that is linear in the observable state
variables of the model. One can go beyond the linear response of policy to the state vari-
ables by relaxing any of the three assumptions. For example, Orphanides and Wieland
(2000) consider a case where policymakers’ preferences are non-quadratic by introducing
a “zone of indiﬀerence” for inﬂation rates between 0 and 2 percent (motivated, for exam-
ple, by some inﬂation-targeting central banks’ oﬃcial charters). Orphanides and Wieland
(2000) also consider a model with a nonlinear Phillips curve with a concave-to-convex
shape (i.e., a shape similar to y = x3) that is like the one estimated by Filardo (1998).
These approaches eﬀectively relax assumptions 1 and 2 above, yielding an optimal nonlin-
ear policy response to unemployment and inﬂation even in a world of perfect certainty, as
well as a world in which disturbances and policymakers’ priors are all normally distributed.
The present paper argues that relaxing the third assumption provides in many cases
a more realistic model of nonlinearities in the conduct of policy. For example, a number
of statements by Federal Reserve oﬃcials in the late 1990s suggest that it was primarily
uncertainty about the economy and its natural rate of unemployment or potential out-2
put that drove their behavior, rather than zone-type preferences or a signiﬁcant belief in
nonlinear Phillips curves. In Levy (2000), Roger Ferguson states that: “Even now as we
talk about imbalances, there is an implicit short-run Phillips curve concept embedded in
the discussion without necessarily saying that the unemployment rate at which inﬂation
starts to pick up is exactly 4.5 percent, or 4.9 percent, or 5.2 percent or 5.5 percent. [I’m]
in the middle in believing that there is a short-term trade-oﬀ between resource utilization
and inﬂation, but not necessarily being wed to a speciﬁc point estimate on the short-run
Phillips curve where inﬂation is likely to accelerate.” In a similar vein, Laurence Meyer
(1999) argues that: “Policymakers could attenuate the response of the real federal funds
rate to declines in the unemployment rate in a region around their estimate of the NAIRU.
But once the unemployment rate gets far enough below (or above) the estimated NAIRU
so that conﬁdence returns that the labor market is experiencing excess demand (or sup-
ply), then the more normal response of real interest rates to incremental declines in the
unemployment rate would again become appropriate.”
This paper shows that relaxing the assumption of normally-distributed priors in favor
of distributions that are more diﬀuse in a region around the mean provides a very simple
rationale for optimal nonlinear policy responses that also matches the intuition in the above
statements very closely. Meyer, Swanson, and Wieland (2001) also discuss this motive for
a nonlinear policy response. The present paper goes beyond that derivative work in several
respects: 1) the key features of policymakers’ priors that lead to an attenuated response of
policy are derived and discussed; 2) this paper shows how such “diﬀuse-middled” priors can
arise naturally in a dynamic model with structural change; 3) the persistence properties and
evolution of policymakers’ beliefs over time is investigated, so that the dynamic behavior
of beliefs in the model is explicitly considered; and 4) the present paper shows how this
analysis extends to optimal policy in a forward-looking model.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section two sets up an illustrative
model of the economy and a univariate signal extraction problem which conveys the basic
intuition for the results. Section three shows that the basic results continue to hold in
more realistic cases by extending the basic model along three dimensions: considering
dynamic behavior of the priors as they evolve over time, multivariate rather than univariate3
signal extraction, and forward-looking rather than backward-looking models. Section four
compares the predictions of the model to actual Fed behavior in the 1990s, and section
ﬁve concludes. A mathematical Appendix derives the technical conditions under which
policymakers’ priors lead to policy attenuation for small surprises in unemployment and
inﬂation.
2. A Simple Model
The main points of this paper are independent of the exact model under consideration;
thus, for the purposes of clarity and illustration, it is advantageous to begin with a model
that is as simple as possible while still conveying all of the relevant intuition. The following





πt = πt−1 − β(ut−1 − u∗)+νt (1b)
where ut is the unemployment rate at time t, rt the real interest rate, πt the inﬂation rate,
u∗ the natural rate of unemployment, r∗ the natural rate of interest, and εt and νt are
stochastic shocks to the system that are orthogonal to all variables dated t − 1 or earlier.
Note that we assume for simplicity that policymakers have direct control over the real
interest rate rt and that although we have stated model (1) in terms of unemployment,
one can just as easily frame it in terms of output or some broad measure of capacity
utilization.
Policymakers set interest rates so as to minimize a discounted sum of squared devi-
ations of unemployment and inﬂation from target values:




(πs − π∗)2 + γ(us − u∗)2
(2)
where π∗ denotes policymakers’ objective for inﬂation, δ is a discount factor, γ is the rela-
tive weight on unemployment stabilization, and policymakers’ objective for unemployment
agrees with the natural rate u∗.
An interesting feature of the model—and one that is of primary relevance for the
present paper—is that u∗ is never observed. Policymakers observe current and past values4
of u and π, and their own past choices for r, which they use to help infer the true value
of u∗ by Bayesian updating. It is assumed for simplicity that the structure of model (1)
and the parameters α, β, θ,a n dr∗ are all known with certainty.
Policymakers’ problem is thus a standard linear-quadratic (LQ) programming prob-
lem with an unobserved state variable, the solution to which is well known (e.g., Bertsekas
(1987)):
rt − r∗ = aE t(ut − u∗)+b(πt − π∗)( 3 )








∗,π t,u t,π s,r s,u s | s<t } (4)
Fu∗|0(·) denotes policymakers’ prior distribution on u∗ at time 0. The constants a and b in
(3) are determined by the parameters of the model and are independent of the variances
σ2
ε and σ2
ν of ε and ν (the property of certainty equivalence). Solution (3) also has the
well-known property of separability of estimation and control: ﬁrst, the unemployment
gap (ut − u∗) is estimated on the basis of all information available at time t, and second,
the interest rate rt is set based on this estimate. It is important to note that solution (3)
and the properties of certainty equivalence and separability of estimation and control are
completely general properties of the LQ model and do not require normality of ε, ν,o rt h e
prior on u∗.1
The problem of estimating u∗ is inherently one of signal extraction: policymakers
never observe the true value of u∗; instead, they receive noisy observations of u∗ through
realizations of ut and πt.2 Policymakers enter period t with prior beliefs about u∗,t h ee x -
pected value of which is Et−1u∗, and based on this prior and lagged variables policymakers
have prior forecasts for ut and πt,n a m e l y :
Et−1ut =( 1− θ)Et−1u∗ + θut−1 + α(rt−1 − r∗) (5a)
Et−1πt = πt−1 − β(ut−1 − Et−1u∗)( 5 b )
1See, e.g., Bertsekas (1987), pp. 102–6, 292–3. We will return to this point for the forward-looking LQ
model in section 3, below.
2To emphasize the signal extraction properties of equations (1), u∗ could be shifted from the left-hand
side to the right-hand side of equation (1a), which would put equations (1) into standard form with the
observed variables on the left-hand side.5
Policymakers use the ex post realizations of ut and πt to update their beliefs about the
true value of u∗ via Bayesian updating. When policymakers’ priors for u∗ and the shocks
ε and ν are all normally distributed, then this estimation stage of policymakers’ problem
is linear in the observed state variables u, π,a n dr. In order to maintain a simple, linear
form for optimal policy in terms of the observable state variables, the literature on optimal
monetary policy has thus maintained the assumption of normality.
However, given the uncertainty policymakers face about the natural rate of unem-
ployment and the possibility of structural change, it seems reasonable to think that pol-
icymakers might have beliefs about u∗ that, rather than being normally distributed, are
more diﬀuse in a region around the mean. Figure 1 below presents density functions for
three distributions that might be used to model policymakers’ beliefs about u∗ (all the
distributions have been centered around a mean of 5 for concreteness and comparability):







The short-dashed line plots a Gaussian density, which is standard in the literature. The
solid line plots a uniform density over the interval [4,6], which implies a much greater
degree of uncertainty about u∗ in a region around the mean (although it has the unrealistic
feature that policymakers are absolutely certain the true value of u∗ lies neither below 4
nor above 6). The long-dashed line represents an intermediate case—it has a density
that is proportional to exp(−0.5(u∗ − 5)4).3 Throughout this paper, we will argue that
these latter two “diﬀuse-middled” distributions are more plausible models of policymakers’
beliefs than is the standard Gaussian assumption, where the term “diﬀuse-middled” refers
3The exact formula is ke− 1
2 ((x−5)/.8)4
, where the normalization constant k =1 /((.8)25/4 Γ(5/4)). The
(short-dashed) normal density is distributed N(5,.16).6
to distributions that are more diﬀuse in a region around the mean than is a Gaussian
distribution of the same variance. In the Appendix, we provide a detailed analysis and
proofs of the relationship between “diﬀuse-middled” priors in general and the features of
optimal policy discussed below. In section 3, below, we show how such beliefs can evolve
naturally in a dynamic model that allows for the possibility of structural change.
The non-normality of policymakers’ priors will be reﬂected in their posterior esti-
mates of u∗ and the unemployment gap, ut − u∗, hence in the setting of optimal policy
in (3). Figure 2 illustrates this process when policymakers only have to perform univari-
ate signal extraction, which we achieve by temporarily dropping equation (1b) from the
model—while multivariate signal extraction is not unduly diﬃcult, the ﬁgures are much
simpler for the univariate case and no intuition is lost from the simpliﬁcation.4 Policy-
makers’ estimates of u∗ and (ut−u∗), which would have been linear in ut had we assumed
priors to be Gaussian, have the following functional forms when we assume the uniform
prior (solid line in Figure 1):5






















Intuitively, because policymakers are so uncertain about u∗ within the interval [4,6], they
are very willing to revise their estimate of u∗ for observations of ut that are well inside
this interval, as is evident in Figure 2a. As observed unemployment moves farther away
4The more general case of multivariate signal extraction is demonstrated as one of the extensions in
section 3, below.
5In these ﬁgures, policymakers’ prior forecast Et−1ut equals 5 (and the expected unemployment gap
Et−1(ut−u∗) is zero); it is easy to show for this simple one-equation version of the model that policymakers
will always have set rt−1 so that this is the case. The standard deviation of εt is set equal to 0.5,
corresponding to annual U.S. data.7
from policymakers’ prior point estimate of 5, however, policymakers assign an increasingly
smaller fraction of each increment of unemployment to u∗, this fraction approaching zero as
ut becomes more and more extreme relative to policymakers’ priors. Correspondingly, the
fraction of each increment of unemployment assigned to the unemployment gap, ut − u∗,
is close to 0 near the middle of Figure 2b, and approaches 1 as ut moves out toward the
edges of that ﬁgure.
As a result, policymakers set rt very cautiously for small surprises in the realized
unemployment rate, but respond increasingly aggressively at the margin as the surprise
in unemployment becomes larger, approaching the marginal certainty-equivalent response
in the limit. Thus, the theory in this paper provides a reﬁnement of the linear signal-
extraction-based motive for optimal policy attenuation discussed in Svensson and Wood-
ford (2003) and Swanson (2004).6 The non-normal priors in this paper accentuate the
attenuation eﬀect by increasing the variance of policymakers’ priors without making the
tails implausibly large; moreover, optimal policy in this paper returns to a more aggressive
policy response at the margin for larger surprises, a feature of policy that seems to match
the intuition oﬀered by Fed Governor Meyer in the Introduction.
Finally, note that these basic features of the results—policy attenuation for small
surprises followed by increasingly aggressive responses at the margin—are not speciﬁc to
the uniform prior. In the Appendix, we prove that these properties hold for a wide class of
distributions that we will refer to as “diﬀuse-middled”—distributions that are more diﬀuse
in a region around the mean than a Gaussian distribution of the same variance. Swanson
(2000) provides additional examples of such distributions.
3. Extensions of the Model
The simple model of the previous section illustrates the basic intuition underlying the
non-normal-priors justiﬁcation for optimal nonlinear policy. In this section, we extend the
6Sack and Wieland (2000) survey the literature on optimal policy attenuation. The motivation given
by Svensson and Woodford (2003) and Swanson (2004) is based on signal extraction, as in the present
paper. Note also that, unlike the present paper, Swanson (2004) takes the signal extraction problem one
step further by assuming the estimated unemployment gap Et(ut − u∗)i sitself an indicator for the true
underlying state variable of interest, Xt, which one might think of as “excess demand.” That feature could
be incorporated into the analysis of the present paper as well, but we do not do so for simplicity.8
illustrative model of the previous section along three dimensions to investigate the robust-
ness of this basic intuition to the following features: 1) dynamic evolution of policymakers’
beliefs over time (including how policymakers might arrive at such “diﬀuse-middled” pri-
ors to begin with), 2) multivariate signal extraction, and 3) optimal monetary policy in a
forward-looking model.
3.1 Dynamic Evolution of Policymakers’ Beliefs
The Bayesian updating in the illustrative model above was essentially static, being com-
puted for only a single period t given priors from period t − 1. This section investigates
two questions: First, how might policymakers have arrived at such a “diﬀuse-middled”
prior in the ﬁrst place? Second, how persistent is this diﬀuse-middled prior—i.e., for how
many periods should the implied nonlinearities in the optimal policy be expected to last?
To answer the ﬁrst question, we use a simple stylized model of structural change. We then
simulate the model forward to show how priors in the model evolve over time to provide
an answer to the second question.
Assume that u∗ is constant over time except for the possibility of structural change,
which follows a Poisson process with arrival probability p each period. Conditional on a
structural break arriving, a jump in u∗ is drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0














Note that the shock η has mean 0 and constant variance, so that equation (1c) preserves
the underlying LQ structure of model (1).7
We set up initial conditions and then simulate model (1) forward over time to see
how policymakers’ beliefs evolve. To keep the simulation simple and focus on the dynamic
evolution of beliefs, we continue to abstract away from inﬂation equation (1b)—which
7The variance of η can be allowed to vary over time, so long as this variation is exogenous (i.e., not
related to any of the endogenous state variables of the model).9
keeps policymakers’ signal extraction problem a univariate one—and we drop interest rates
from the model (α = 0 in equation (1a)), so that policymakers just observe the economy
and update their beliefs about u∗ over time. These simpliﬁcations reduce the number of
variables we must keep track of over time and make the simulation very clear and intuitive.
We initialize the model in period 0 with a prior distribution on u∗ that is normally
distributed with mean 6 and standard deviation 0.3, which is a rough calibration to the
U.S. economy in the mid-1990s. We choose a normal distribution as the initial prior
to demonstrate that even starting from a purely Gaussian prior, we can arrive at the
more diﬀuse types of distributions discussed above. Moreover, after many periods without
structural change, policymakers’ beliefs would evolve to a distribution that is close to
normally distributed anyway, so one can argue that a normal distribution is also roughly
calibrated to the U.S. economy in the mid-1990s, when there had not been a substantial
structural break in u∗ for many years. We set p = .01 and σ = 1, so that a break in u∗
occurs roughly once every 25 years and each break draws a jump in u∗ from a N(0,1)
distribution. Based on quarterly U.S. data, we set θ = .8a n dσε = .3 in equation (1a).8
These parameters are all known by policymakers with certainty.
Figure 3 presents the results from simulating this model forward for 18 quarters. The
solid line in each panel plots policymakers’ beliefs in each period for the model described
above, while the dotted line plots results for the same model without structural change
(i.e., setting p = 0) for comparison. The time 0 prior for each model is plotted in the upper
left-most panel; the results for the ﬁrst four quarters (t =1 ,...,4) are not reported in the
ﬁgure because they are not very diﬀerent from the t =0a n dt = 5 cases. Simulating the
model forward requires drawing values for ut each period; we use the quarterly values of
unemployment realized in the U.S. from 1997Q1 through 2001Q1, which are listed at the
top of each panel.9
The simulation becomes interesting after about 5 or 6 quarters. By this point, re-
peated realizations of ut below policymakers’ prior mean of 6 cause them to place noticeable
8We estimate these parameters over the period 1964–2002. We HP-ﬁlter ut to measure u∗.T h e
unemployment gap ﬁts an AR(2) process better than an AR(1), but to keep the simulation down to a
single state variable (ut−1), we just use the dominant root of the AR(2) polynomial.
9Realized unemployment rates for t =1 ,...,4 are 5.2, 5.2, 5.1, 4.9, respectively.10
Figure 3: Dynamic Simulation of Policymakers’ Beliefs






















































































































































probability on a structural break having occurred. This is seen as a fat left tail of the dis-
tribution for u∗, which shows that beliefs about u∗ are becoming increasingly diﬀuse. After
about 11 or 12 quarters, policymakers’ beliefs display a clear bimodal pattern, with “New
Economy” (low u∗) and “Old Economy” (high u∗) regimes. Once policymakers’ beliefs
reach this point, they are extremely uncertain about the true value of u∗ over a wide
range of intermediate values, and they begin to revise their beliefs very strongly as new
information comes in. This uncertainty persists for several quarters, and is still evident 18
quarters from the start of the simulation in the bottom right panel.
By contrast, in the model without structural change (dotted lines in Figure 3), poli-
cymakers’ beliefs have a Gaussian distribution in every period. Even though policymakers
update their beliefs each period in response to incoming data, the Gaussian prior and
Gaussian shocks ensure that only the mean of the distribution is revised (with the variance
gradually shrinking over time), while the overall Gaussian functional form is preserved.
Figure 4 maps these sequences of beliefs into policymakers’ optimal estimate of the
unemployment gap over time (left panel) and with respect to the observed unemployment
rate (right panel).















The solid (dashed) lines plot policymakers’ estimates in the model with (without) struc-
tural change. In the model without structural change, policymakers revise their estimates
of the unemployment gap essentially linearly with the observed unemployment rate, the
only deviation from linearity arising from the gradual shrinking of the variance of policy-
makers’ beliefs about u∗ over time. By contrast, the model with structural change begins12
to show very strong departures from linearity after about 6 or 7 quarters—at this point,
policymakers are starting to place substantial weight on the possibility that structural
change has occurred, and that they may have been overestimating the size of the unem-
ployment gap. Thus, their optimal estimate of the gap (in this simulation) is actually
backward-bending, since they begin to revise their estimate of the gap backward (revising
u∗ at the margin even more rapidly than ut is falling) to make up for possible previous
overestimates. Although the backward-bending feature of Figure 4 depends on the speciﬁcs
of the model and the simulation, the basic intuition underlying policymakers’ estimates of
u∗ and the unemployment gap is identical to the simple model in the previous section.
Note that an interesting feature of this model of structural change is that the usual
state of the world is one in which policymakers’ beliefs are close to normal—and thus
that optimal updating and optimal policy are usually close to linear. The nonlinearity
emphasized here and in the previous section only becomes relevant when policymakers
beliefs about u∗ become suﬃciently diﬀuse in a region around the mean—in this case,
when policymakers begin to suspect that a structural break in the model might have
occurred. This nonlinearity persists for several quarters and then gradually dies out as
policymakers’ beliefs converge gradually back toward normality once again.
3.2 Multivariate Signal Extraction
For simplicity, the previous sections have considered stylized models with only a single
indicator variable—univariate signal extraction. In this section, we reinstate the inﬂation
equation (1b) of the baseline model, and let policymakers update their beliefs about the
unobserved variable u∗ in response to both indicators: unemployment and inﬂation. For
this more general case, policymakers’ optimal inference and response functions are no
longer functions simply of ut, but now also depend on the realized inﬂation rate πt, resulting
in graphs that are no longer two-dimensional, as in section 2, but are instead surface plots
of policymakers’ optimal estimates of u∗ and ut − u∗ as functions of the surprises in
unemployment and inﬂation both, as in Figures 5a and b below.
To graph these functions, we roughly calibrate the parameters of the model to the
U.S. economy from 1965–2000, this time to annual data since we will focus on a single13
period t rather than trace the dynamics of the model over time. These parameter values
are set as follows: θ =0 .4, α =0 .15, β =0 .4, r∗ =2 .5, σε =0 .5, and σν =0 .6. We
allow for a correlation between εt and νt of −0.5, also in line with annual U.S. data over
this period. We initialize the model with values of πt−1 =2 .0 percent, ut−1 =4 .2, and
rt−1 =3 .0, which correspond to core PCE inﬂation, unemployment, and the real federal
funds rate in the U.S. in 1999. We use the uniform prior on u∗ from Figure 1, which has
Et−1u∗ = 5 percent. From model (1), this implies prior forecasts for unemployment ut in
2000 of 4.76 percent and inﬂation πt of 2.32 percent, respectively.
When data on unemployment and inﬂation for 2000 come in, policymakers in the
model revise their beliefs about u∗ and the unemployment gap ut−u∗ on the basis of these


























































In these ﬁgures, we can consider simultaneous surprises in unemployment and inﬂation of
any magnitudes, and their eﬀects on policymakers’ optimal estimates.
The same intuition as in the baseline model holds in Figure 5: as can be seen in the
right-hand panel, policymakers will update their estimate of the unemployment gap (and
hence set rt) very cautiously in response to small surprises in unemployment and inﬂation,
where the “size of the surprise” here is the size of the joint surprise in unemployment and
inﬂation both, as measured from the bivariate distribution that describes the shocks to
these variables (in this example, a bivariate normal distribution). As the size of the surprise
gets larger, policymakers will set rt more aggressively at the margin, as they become less
willing to revise their estimates of u∗ further.14
3.3 Forward-Looking Models
The results of this paper also apply more broadly than to just the simple backward-looking
model (1) considered so far. The same ideas of signal extraction and optimal updating with
a non-normal prior apply just as easily to any model that exhibits separation of estimation
and control, including forward-looking models that possess this property. For example,
Pearlman, Currie, and Levine (1986), Pearlman (1992), and Svensson and Woodford (2003)
show that the forward-looking LQ model possesses this property. Thus, if we consider a
forward-looking version of model (1):
(ut − u∗)=θ1(ut−1 − u∗)+θ2 Et(ut+1 − u∗)+α(rt−1 − r∗)+εt (6a)
(πt − π∗)=φ1(πt−1 − π∗)+φ2Et(πt+1 − π∗) − β(ut−1 − u∗)+νt (6b)
and policymakers’ preferences and information set are given, as before, by:




(πs − π∗)2 + γ(us − u∗)2
It ≡{ α,β,γ,δ,θ1,θ 2,φ 1,φ 2,σ2
ε,σ2
ν,F u∗|0(·),π∗,r ∗,π t,u t,π s,r s,u s | s<t }
then the above authors show that the optimal policy under commitment satisﬁes:10
rt − r∗ = cE t(ut − u∗)+d(πt − π∗)( 7 )
where c and d are constants that can be computed from the parameters θ1, θ2, φ1, φ2,
α, β, γ,a n dδ using the methods described in those papers.11 The analysis of optimal
policy with a non-normal prior is then exactly the same as before: policymakers form an
optimal estimate of the unemployment gap, Et(ut − u∗), and then set policy according
to this estimate. So long as the control stage of the problem is separate from that of
estimation, the same types of diagrams presented earlier remain relevant for thinking
about the problem, and the same intuition applies.
10The optimal policy under discretion is also linear, although the coeﬃcients c and d would be diﬀerent.
11Note that the property of separability of estimation and control in equation (7) is a special feature
of the LQ model under optimal policy. For example, if one considers a simple rule rather than the fully
optimal rule, then estimation and control are not separable and the solution to the model becomes much
more diﬃcult computationally (Meyer, Swanson, and Wieland (2001) consider this case). Similarly, if
any of the parameters of the model are not known with certainty, then the optimal policy must take into
account learning about these parameters by policymakers, which again becomes computationally much
more diﬃcult (Wieland (2003) analyzes this case).15






















Fed Funds Rate and Taylor−type Rule
Figure 6b
4. Discussion
For the diﬀuse-middled class of prior distributions analyzed above and in the Appendix, it
is optimal for policy to respond cautiously to small surprises in the observed unemployment
rate, but to respond increasingly more aggressively at the margin as the size of the surprise
gets larger. These features of optimal policy match statements by Federal Reserve oﬃcials
in the late 1990s presented in the Introduction, and Figure 6 suggests that it also matches
the behavior of the Fed over this period.
The left-hand panel, Figure 6a, plots the quarterly U.S. unemployment rate from
1986 to 2001, along with a dashed horizontal line at ut = 6 to depict a common estimate
of the natural unemployment rate in the mid-1990s (e.g., Staiger, Stock, and Watson
(1997)). The right-hand panel, Figure 6b, compares the Federal Reserve’s actual interest
rate policy (solid line) to what would have been prescribed by a Taylor (1993) type rule
(dashed line) based on GDP deﬂator inﬂation (not shown) and the unemployment rate
data in Figure 6a.12
The Taylor-type rule in Figure 6b tracks the Fed’s actual behavior fairly well until
about 1997, at which point the two diverge noticeably. In particular, the Fed appears
to have been much less aggressive between 1997 and 1999 than a Taylor rule based on
12The Taylor-type rule in Figure 6b is given by it = r∗ +πt +α(πt −π∗)−β(ut −u∗), where r∗ =2 .75,
π∗ =2 ,u∗ =6 ,α =0 .5, and β =1 .8, ut denotes the unemployment rate in Figure 6a, and πt the
four-quarter change in GDP deﬂator inﬂation.16
previous estimates of u∗ would have implied. Beginning sometime in 1999, however, the Fed
appears to have returned to the marginal responsiveness implied by the Taylor Rule—i.e.,
the marginal prescriptions from the Taylor rule seem to coincide with the Fed’s marginal
interest rate moves in 1999 and 2000, even though the levels had diverged as a result of
the Fed’s earlier cautiousness. The Fed’s behavior over this recent historical episode—an
attenuation in the responsiveness of policy for a time, followed by a return to a more
aggressive response at the margin—seems to match the intuition behind optimal updating
and optimal policy presented in this paper.
5. Conclusions
The literature on optimal monetary policy typically makes three major assumptions for
tractability and simplicity: 1) policymakers’ preferences are quadratic, 2) the economy is
linear, and 3) stochastic shocks and policymakers’ priors about unobserved variables are
normally distributed. The linearity of the optimal policy that results from these assump-
tions is an advantage when maximum simplicity is required, but arguably detracts from
the realism of the model in many cases.
This paper argues that relaxing the third assumption provides a tractable and real-
istic model of nonlinearities in the optimal and actual conduct of policy. Tractability is
maintained through the principle of separation of estimation and control, which continues
to hold in the LQ framework despite the non-normal priors that are the focus of this pa-
per. For example, separability of estimation and control allows the basic insights of the
paper to be extended in a natural way to forward-looking LQ models, which have become
a baseline for much of the recent literature on optimal monetary policy.
The empirical relevance of the nonlinearities presented in this paper are demonstrated
in two ways. First, a simple simulation shows how “diﬀuse-middled” priors can arise
naturally in a dynamic model with structural change. Second, statements by Federal
Reserve oﬃcials and the behavior of the Fed in the 1990s are shown to line up with the
basic insights of the model. Thus, the optimal nonlinearities demonstrated in this paper
appear to be relevant in practice as well as in principle.17
Finally, the results demonstrated in this paper are not speciﬁc to models of monetary
policy comprising an output equation and an inﬂation equation, but rather apply to any
signal extraction problem with non-normal priors on a key unobserved variable of the
model. Since policymakers in a variety of contexts face the problem of updating priors
about unobserved variables through signal extraction, and these priors may well be more
diﬀuse in a region around the mean than a Gaussian distribution, the basic insights in this
paper should be regarded as being potentially applicable to a wide variety of situations.18
Appendix: Mathematical Derivations
Let policymakers’ prior (time t − 1) distribution on u∗ be given by the density function
f(u∗). The mean of this distribution is assumed to exist, and without loss of generality,
equals 0. The variance is assumed to exist and equals σ∗2.G i v e n u∗, the (observable)
unemployment rate ut is distributed N(u∗,σ2), with density denoted by φ. We now show
what qualities of the density f lead to the features of optimal nonlinear policy emphasized
in the text, namely: (1) that the responsiveness of policy is attenuated relative to normal
for small surprises (ut ≈ 0), and (2) that the marginal responsiveness of policy increases
in the size of the surprise in ut.
We restrict attention to the case of one observable variable, ut, for clarity. The
analysis for multiple observable variables is essentially identical—one need only calculate
the size of the joint surprise to determine the extent of updating of policymakers’ priors
that takes place.






We will make use of the following Lemma:
Lemma 1: Assume that policymakers set the interest rate rt as a decreasing linear function
of the estimated unemployment gap, ut − E[u∗|ut]. Then the marginal responsiveness of
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and µ ≡ E[u∗|ut].
Proof: (A2)–(A4) follow from (A1) by successive diﬀerentiation through the integral.
Note that for f normally distributed, Var[u∗|ut] is independent of ut a n dl e s st h a n1 ,
so that the marginal responsiveness of policy to ut is constant and negative.19
By equation (A2), property (1) above is equivalent to Var[u∗|ut] being larger than
normal when evaluated at ut =0 . 13 We begin with the assumption that f is Gaussian, and
consider what perturbations increase the conditional variance in (A2). This is essentially
a calculus of variations problem. The following diagram serves as a useful illustration:







where the solid line in the ﬁgure depicts the density f, the short-dashed line φ,a n dt h e
long-dashed line the function y = x2.T h e q u a n t i t y V a r [ u∗|ut = 0] is (up to a constant






Holding the denominator constant, we can think of increasing the value of this quantity by
reducing f where the product u∗2φ(u∗) is small, and increasing f where the same product
is large. Thus, we reduce f near 0, and increase f for intermediate values of u∗.
We prove this formally via a variational argument on f as follows:
Proposition 1: For prior distributions fδ that are suﬃciently close to a Gaussian distri-
bution f, property (1) (policy attenuation near 0) is possessed by distributions fδ that are
more diﬀuse than f in a region around the mean.
Proof: Consider a perturbation of the density function f by an amount δ over the interval











13There is nothing that prevents Var[u∗|ut] > 1 and (A2) from being positive (e.g., in a two-regime
model such as in section 3 or Swanson (2000)). In such a situation, we interpret a further increase in (A2)



























This quantity is less than 0 for ξ = 0. It is actually greater than 0 as |ξ| tends toward
inﬁnity, though the eﬀect is very small (because φ(ξ) is so small). More speciﬁcally, it
is negative for ξ2 <E [u∗2|ut =0 ]a n dpo s i t i v ef o rξ2 >E [u∗2|ut = 0]. Thus, perturbing
f downward at 0 (and pushing it upward for intermediate and large values of |ξ|)l e a d s
policy to have property (1) emphasized in the text.
Note that equation (A8) holds for non-Gaussian base distributions f as well, so that
the variational argument is valid for f signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from a normal distribution,
as well as very close to Gaussian.
We can use the same technique to determine what distributions f possess prop-
erty (2). We’ll make use of the following lemma:
Lemma 2: Let f be a density function and let fδ be a perturbation of f by an amount δ











φ(u∗)f(u∗)du∗ (ξn − µ0,n)+o(h) (A10)
where limh→0 o(h)/h =0 .
Proof: Simple generalization of equations (A6)–(A8).
Proposition 2: For prior distributions fδ that are suﬃciently close to a Gaussian dis-
tribution f, property (2) (an increasingly aggressive response to unemployment at the
margin) is possessed for ut near 0 by distributions fδ that are more diﬀuse than f in a
region around the mean and with tails that are thinner than f.21
Proof: Property (2) states that policy should be concave for ut > 0 and convex for
ut < 0. From equations (A3) and (A4), this is equivalent to Skew[u∗|ut=0]=0 and Exc.
Kurt[u∗|ut=0]< 0. We wish to know for which distributions fδ this is the case.
A straightforward calculation yields:
Exc. Kurt[u∗|ut=0] = µδ,4 − 4µδ,3µδ,1 − 3µ2
δ,2 +1 2 µδ,2µ2
δ,1 − 6µ4
δ,1 (A11)
where µδ,n is the nth moment of fδ as deﬁned in (A9). Diﬀerentiating (A11) with respect
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after using µ1 =0 ,µ3 =0 ,a n dµ4 =3 µ2
2 for the base Gaussian density f.
Now, the polynomial in ξ inside the square brackets in (A14) is positive at ξ =0 ,
is positive as |ξ|→∞(though the eﬀect on (A14) is small because φ(ξ) is small), and




6)µ2, hence is negative for intermediate values of ξ—











.T h u s ,p r o p e r t y( 2 )
is satisﬁed by distributions fδ that are perturbed downward at 0, downward in the tails,
and upward for intermediate values of ξ. Keeping the density fδ symmetric ensures that
Skew[u∗|ut=0]=0.
Note that—in contrast to property (1)—property (2) is a feature of distributions
that have thin tails, but both property (1) and (2) are possessed by distributions that are
more diﬀuse in a region around the mean than a base Gaussian density f.22
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